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interferon preparation was thrice
weekly. “Because,” came the reply,
“that’s what our marketing
department decided would be best.”
Like another remarkable book
about blood, published 20 years ago,
Richard Titmuss’s The Gift
Relationship, the tale that Stephen
Hall unfolds with such vivid
command is that of our society in
microcosm. Taxes may be
inescapable, but death is
discretionary, its conquest the last
scientific frontier. But it was, I think,
an economist of Titmuss’s generation
who urged that, as in earlier days, the
proper end of life was to collapse
under a huge burden of firewood and
be eaten by wolves.
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In his book The Art of the Soluble,
Peter Medawar states that to students
of the 1930s “… experimental
embryology was the subject that
seemed most exciting, … that most
nearly on the threshold of a grand
revelation.” Much of the excitement
was due to the discovery of
embryonic induction by Hans
Spemann and Hilde Mangold, which
promised to reveal not only how
embryos are made but the nature of
molecular instruction itself. The task
proved hard, however, and Medawar
opted for immunology — brilliantly
as it turned out — complaining that
despite the exactitude (“even
punctilio”) of descriptive embryology,
it wouldn’t get far without genetics
and a theory to account for it.
If revelations are the point of
science, the more recent unravelling
of the molecular genetic mechanisms
that pattern fruit fly development
must rank high in grandeur. By the
early 1980s, when I had been
working on regeneration in the
vertebrate nervous system,
development was becoming
increasingly fascinating and the time
seemed ripe for looking at large-
scale, segmental (metameric)
patterning in vertebrate embryos.
Just the kind of thing, you might
think, that would have been sorted
out years ago by biologists and their
light microscopes, but a chance
encounter in the departmental
library with a 1933 paper by George
Streeter [1] entirely changed my
preconceptions.
He had called it “The status of
metamerism in the central nervous
system of chick embryos,” and the
fact that there was any question
about metamerism in vertebrate
embryos was remarkable enough. As
I read on, it was easy to see that here
was an eloquent attempt at the last
word on a subject that had exercised
the nervous systems of previous
generations to the point of passion.
The paper was essentially a
demolition job, and not the first in the
field. In 1858, T.H. Huxley famously
shattered Goethe’s segmented
vertebrate skull, but within 40 years
segmentation had been resurrected
with full force by comparative
embryologists, this time to include
the central nervous system (CNS).
The chief object of Streeter’s
contempt was Charles Hill, who
“… apparently intoxicated by the
simplification of the mechanics of
development that seemed to be
offered by the principle of
metamerism” had the temerity to
suggest that the vertebrate CNS is
metameric in origin “from stem to
stern.” Hill’s drawings, Streeter
cynically declared, illustrated neural
segmentation “… with great daring,”
his “evanescent segments” had been
far too influential, and that to draw
“rigid geometrical” lines across the
developing brain where they did not
exist was nothing short of “an act of
rank pedagogic violence.” Instead,
Streeter insisted simply, neural
segments “… are not justified by the
available evidence” — which
included his own detailed
observations — and that to
pronounce otherwise was “to lean
more toward the principles of the
tailor shop than toward those typical
of living embryonic tissue.” He did
somewhat grudgingly admit that his
anti-metamerism should perhaps be
qualified in the case of the hindbrain
— to me so impressively segmented
from even a glance down the
microscope at a living chick embryo
— but in his main conclusion he took
the extreme view.
To someone schooled in the
unshakeable certainties of
anatomical description, in the belief
that the punctilio of vertebrate
development had been worked over
with such accuracy that all dissent
had been extinguished, this was
heady stuff. Here, it seemed, was the
reason why the field had remained
essentially inactive for the next 50
years, as if dealt a mortal blow by
Streeter’s paper. But at least the
whole business of segmentation in
the nervous system had mattered
once and could therefore matter once
more, and so I was motivated. It was
plain that there was plenty left to do,
that the striking segmental patterns
so visible in the nervous system of
living chicks were more than dead
ducks and should be looked at again.
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